Evolution, Teleology, and History by Tsanoff, Radoslav A.
EVOLUTION, TELEOLOGY, AND HISTORY 
HIS essay is an inquiry into the correlation of some 
fundamental views of the world and ourselves in it. Our 
main concern will be to understand more clearly the mean- 
ing and the scope of evolution. But to this end we shall first 
try to distinguish the historical pattern of ideas from that 
of the physical sciences. Traditional terms like natural his- 
tory and natural science indicate an awareness of some kin- 
ships but also of a basic difference in outlook which should 
be clarified. We ask: Does the world-view of physical science 
include any recognition of history in nature? The readily 
forthcoming negative answer would indicate the need of 
recognizing the historical and maybe yet other types of in- 
terpretation as essential to a comprehensive understanding 
of nature and human nature. And in such a more thorough 
world-view, we may then consider the range and the main 
direction of the evolutionary outlook. 
A dominant tendency in modem thought has been the 
emphasis on a dynamic conception of natwe as a system of 
processes. This idea has some old roots in classical antiquity, 
as is indicated by the varied connotation of the Greek word 
for nature, physis, from which we get our terms "cphysics," 
"physical." Physis meant origin or birth and growth, the 
source and process of activity in a thing, how it comes to be 
what it is, how it arises and realizes its character and con- 
stitution. The basic Greek question seems to have been: 
"How come?" When this active principle was regarded as 
the essential element, physis signified the primary stuff or 
matter, the substance or matrix of which things are made. 
Physis also came to connote the power of growth or vital 
agency in living things. Or else the essence of things was 
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viewed in terms of their form and system, and then physis 
was considered as the cosmic order, and by extension the 
universe. 
The Latin word natura had a similar flexibility of meaning. 
I t  was derived from the verb nascor, meaning "to be born." 
"The nature of things" signified their birth and original pro- 
duction, their heart and core, their essential substance and 
constitution. I t  came to mean the orderly source and course, 
the generation and pattern of things. In this brief verbal 
analysis the student of ancient thought may recognize hints of 
leading ideas in contending philosophical theories. 
The emphasis on process is evident in the fundamental 
contemporary reconstruction of physics. In philosophy it 
may be noted in the ascendency of activism, Its kinship with 
an expansive evolutionaiy interpretation of all nature seems 
obvious: so obvious indeed as to call for some cautious re- 
appraisal. Still more critically we should consider here the 
conclusion of some activists that the view of the world as 
process implies a basically historical perspective, a world- 
history. The growing importance of genetic methods of re- 
search, scientific explanation in terms of development, both 
of them have seemed to indicate a historical slant of thought. 
The South African philosopher, General Smuts, stated: "If 
activity is the essence of the universe, we see more easily 
why the universe is evolutionary and historical rather t l ~aa  
static and unchangeable."* And John Dewey was even more 
explicit: "Aside from mathematics, all knowledge is historic; 
chemistry, geology, physiology, as well as anthropology and 
those human events to which, airogantly, we usually restrict 
the title of histoiy.""egel, on the other hand, rejected the 
appropriateness of the t e rn  "natural history." He declared 
roundly: "Nature has no hist~ry."~ We have here two half- 
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truths or two partial truths; the balance of emphasis, in our 
judgment, should incline towards Hegel's view. History, 
strictly considered, would seem to be concerned with dis- 
tinctively human aEairs. But this historical character, which 
is preeminently manifested in the careers of men and 
peoples, may also be regarded as a cosmic aspect which we 
can recognize in a measure, though far less relevantly or 
less signiEcantly, in other fields of nature. 
Keeping in mind the sharp divergence of judgment indi- 
cated above and our initial surmise by way of reconciliation, 
we should turn more carefully to our problem. Decisively 
characteristic of physical science is its view of the causaI 
unifoimity of nature. From this standpoint every type of 
process is to be regarded and explained as the necessary re- 
sult of some variety of antecedent conditions. This system of 
uniformities is viewed as the general cosmic pattern. The 
detailed processes, to be sure, are in time, but the necessary 
connection which they exemplify are basic characteristics of 
the entire system across the time-span of specific occurrences. 
The book of nature, as read by physical science, has no dis- 
tinctively historical pages, or we may say that its uniformi- 
ties are all on one vast cosmic page. There is, to be sure, a 
history of physical science as a human activity and achieve- 
ment; but is it conceivable that we could study the subject 
matter of physics or chemistry in any kind of historical order? 
Thus we may say that physical nature, throughout num- 
berless changes, manifests its basic and invariable uniformi- 
ties. It does not reveal the progressive development and self- 
realization, or else the frustration, decline and fall, which 
are the marks of a historical perspective. In our clay this 
view has been developed by Collingwood and also by the 
Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset. The so-called science 
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of human nature, according to them, is a misconceived un- 
dertaking. It set out from the false presupposition that there 
is a certain entity called mind which is and remains there 
awaiting our analysis. But actually men and men's minds do 
not stay put, to be described and defined abstractly. Persons 
are ever in the process of achieving, developing, or misdirect- 
ing theis character and significance. Their career must be 
studied in a biographical or historical view. Most emphati- 
cally Ortega y Gasset insists: "Man. . . has no nature; what he 
has is . . . hi~tory,"~ So the proper study of man is history, 
and we may say explicitly that the various humanities are 
chapters or branches of history. 
This sharp separation of physical nature and human his- 
tory calls for a cautious reconsideration, especially when 
we deal with the biological sciences. Is it altogether without 
significance that evolutionaly ideas have been used so ex- 
tensively in the various humanities: from the evolution of 
species to the evolution of social and economic institutions, 
evolutioiz of language, of morals, of reIigion? Our attention 
may thus be dixected to the essentially genetic and develop- 
mental character of evolutionary research, be it biological, 
anthropological, or explicitly humanistic. This aspect of 
evolutionism has been related to the basic outlook on reality 
as process. But is this outlook historical? 
We should be on our guard here to avoid a confusion of 
fundamental ideas, Evolution may be interpreted in the 
specific Dalwinian sense as the causally determined process 
of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence 
through fortuitous variations adaptable to specific en- 
vironments. Or evolution may be used in the broader mean- 
ing of development, the unfolding of a process or a folm of 
activity differing in kind under a variety of conditions. To be 
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sure, there is a thought common to both of these uses of 
our term. The historian Bury called it "the genetic idea."6 
Darwin's epoch-making success in reconstructing biology on 
this genetic evolutionary basis inspired other workers to ap- 
ply analogous methods to anthropological and humanistic 
research. This analogy of method has often been ambiguous. 
I t  has been guided by a due recognition of the essential dif- 
ferences between physical processes and historical activities. 
But it has also tended mistakenly to proceed from the ac- 
knowledgment of some quasi-historical aspects of the se- 
quence of events in biological evolution, to the inference that 
human history can also be understood in strictly physical- 
biological terns. 
The distinction here should not be drawn too sharply or 
rigidly, but neither should it be dismissed. The sound dis- 
tinction should be one of emphasis, Historical studies may 
retain some elements of c'naturalistic" method which is charac- 
teristic and dominant in physical science. Science in the 
form of "natural history" may entertain some aspects of the 
method which is more clearly and appropriately used in hu- 
man history. We can understand both the correlation and the 
distinction between these two as our cosmic outlook proceeds 
from one of these perspectives to the other. 
In making this last distinction we are, of course, clearly 
aware that we are comparing and also contrasting a neces- 
sarily abstract view of reality with one that aims at greater 
concreteness. From this standpoint it may be said that the 
abstract universality of the physical sciences cannot grasp 
fully the concrete reality which is portrayed in the historical 
perspective. The so-called natural history or history of nature 
is, as Croce put it, a '~pseudo-history,"G If I am to view any- 
thing in nature in a truly historical manner, I should have 
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to cease regarding it as of a certain class or genus and should 
try to see it concretely in the way in which I would have to 
consider it if it were human. I might then proceed to study 
the biography, say, of a grizzly or of a glacier or a dust bowl, 
but as it came to manifest historical portraiture it would tend 
to lose scientific analysis and definition. The strict scientist 
might even suspect such accounts as 'hature-faking." On the 
other hand, we should not overlook the opposite procedure, 
in which the concrete actuality of ongoing human life has 
been forced, with what may be called "histoly-faking," into 
the abstract framework of materialistic determinism. 
This distinction, between scientific explanation and his- 
torical portraiture, points to a basic issue of philosophical 
interpretation. I t  is the issue between mechanism and 
teleology. I t  is accentuated in biology even more than in the 
other physical sciences; or better, the fundamental account 
of biological processes emphasizes the issue in a distinctive 
way which is decisive. 
Physics and chemistry in their own fields and perspectives 
proceed on a definitely mechanistic basis. It would be only 
confusing to import teleological reasoning into astronomy or 
geology. Modern physical science has made its s e a t  ad- 
vances precisely because it has recognized and respected its 
- 
own appropriate postulates. Our problem here arises when 
we tuin from strict pl~ysics to a more integral view of nature 
and lluman nature. The commitment to mechanistic cate- 
gories, which is essential to the effective physical account 
of nature, misses somehow the characteristic interpretation 
of human lives. Valid in its own field and on its own postu- 
lates, physical science seems to indicate the need of other sig- 
nificant views of nature, if we are to understand ourselves 
and our own scientific activities as well as the physical sys- 
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tem of the world with which we are dealing. So we may say 
that while the principle of teleology is not required, is indeed 
excluded, in physical science itself, it is raised as a problem 
by physical science in its relation to an ultimate philosophi- 
cal interpretation of reality. 
The role of teleological reasoning in biology seems to be 
a different one, but about this alleged difference there has 
been a radical controversy in evolutionary theory. We should 
appraise this disputed evolutionary teleology by considering 
some of the contending views about it. 
One side of the argument is the stxictly mechanistic inter- 
pretation of evolution. The materialistic evolutionist judges 
that Darwin's principal systematic achievement was his in- 
tegration of biology with the other physical sciences, his ex- 
clusion of Providential or any other kind of design as a bio- 
logical explanatory principle. According to this view, the 
fuller development of evolutionary biology must be only 
along these mechanistic lines. Thus Ernst Waeckel advocated 
explicitly a "dysteleological" method. Against any appeal to 
design in biological theory or against any interpretation of 
adaptation or fitness as in any sense purposive, he demanded 
insistently a mechanistic explanation analogous to that in 
pllysics and chemistry. 
The mechanistic evolutionist has dismissed the traditional 
doctrine of design both by outright rejection and by cita- 
tion of negative evidence. One type of evidence for "dys- 
teleology" or purposelessness is that of rudimentary or 
vestigial organs. How can a teleological biology explain the 
vermiform appendix in the human intestinal system? In our 
herbivorous ancestors it was much larger and of great diges- 
tive use. In us it is an evolutionary survival, useless and often 
injurious. The comparative anatomist can undestand its 
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persistence, if he adheres to his mechanistic view of zoologi- 
cal evolution. On a teleological plan, however, it is only per- 
plexing. In a theological version of a design in nature, it 
would cast reflection either on the goodness or on the good 
sense of Divine Providence. 
This sort of strictly mechanistic rejection of purposive 
adaptation in any form has been criticized as failing to do 
justice to many facts in biological evolution. Some of these 
objections seem fundamental. Without reverting to the tradi- 
tional doctrine of Providential design in nature, some biolo- 
gists have found it necessary to include in their evolutionary 
theories the recognition of teleology in some form. A con- 
sideration of some of the more important alternatives to a 
rigidly mechanistic biology may outline the wide range of 
basic thinking in the evolutionary field. I shall be brief be- 
cause the major theories have been examined with great care 
by my colleague in this symposium, Professor Fulton, 
In the history of ideas, Vitalism in some form has always 
expressed the insistence that living beings manifest some- 
thing unique and fundamentally different from anything in 
the fields of physics and chemistry, To understand living be- 
havior we must recognize some special directive power in 
every organism. This trend of speculation connects the names 
of Erigena, Paracelsus, Stahl, Schopenhauer. The unique 
teleological factor has been called by various names: vital 
principle, vital force, or as Hans Driesch, a chief modern 
advocate of the theory, phrases it, borrowing his term fxom 
Aristotle, "entelechy." The modern vitalist rejects any mecha- 
nistic reductionism in biology. Unlike physical or chemi- 
cal process, organic behavior and evolution manifest a cer- 
tain autonomy of character, a unique principle of adaptation 
for self-maintenance. The observable facts of organic regen- 
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eration indicate an integral capacity of the organism to a d  
determinately as a whole on any of its specific parts. This 
mutuality of the whole and its parts is inexplicable on any 
rigidly mechanistic theory. 
This doctrine has, of course, met strong rebuffs from the 
mechanists, but it has also been severely criticized by think- 
ers who question or who reject strict materialism. Instead of 
postulating a special ''vital forcey' to explain biological proc- 
esses, should we not rather study the behavior of living 
beings, recognizing both the features which are shared with 
pl~ysical and chemical reactions, and also the peculiar and 
distinctive biological characteristics? Among the latter, 
special attention has been called to self-repair and restora- 
tion, to the related biological principle of maintenance of 
noi-mality, and to the factors of integration and coordinated 
behavior. Vitalism has been criticized for its proposed cleav- 
age between organic and inorganic nature. Why maintain 
such a radical discontinuity? Why may it not be that the 
physico-chemical substances and processes, under certain so- 
called organic conditions, become the matrix for the manifes- 
tation of new properties and new forms of behavior? 
This latter alternative view is expressed in the theory of 
Emergent Evolution, advocated by the biologist Lloyd Mor- 
gan and expanded with systematic mastery in the cosmology 
of Samuel Alexander. Alexander's statement may be cited: 
"New orders of finites come into existence in Time. . . . New 
complexity of motions come into existence, a new quality 
emerges. . . ."' The primary groundwork of existence, wl~ich 
Alexander calls Space-Time, operates in a system of causal 
mechanism familiar to us in the physical sciences. But under 
certain conditions it becomes the niatsix for a radically new 
order and quality of being which we call Life. And just as 
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Life thus unpredictably yet unmistakably emerges out of 
Space-Time, so Mind emerges out of Life, intelligence out of 
organic-biological behavior. 
In considering the relation of the lower or matrix to the 
higher or emergent character, we are warned to avoid a 
twofold error. We should not, like the materialists, reduce 
the higher to the lower and interpret life and mind as simply 
more complex mechanisms. Nor should we, like so many 
idealists, overemphasize the higher quality and regard physi- 
cal existence as essentially a latent form of spirit. At every 
Ievel of existence we should do justice to the facts: recognize 
that level for what it is, but also see it as the emergent from 
lower levels and likewise as the matrix of a higher realiza- 
tion. The theory of emergent evolution would avoid over- 
simplification of nature or reductionism in any direction. I t  
would recognize the complexity of existence with its three 
main stages, physical mechanism, life, and mind. And it 
would not rigidly assign Emits to the process of emergence, 
for Mind already indicates a boundless upward reach of 
spiritual character. All along this dynamic range the higher 
quality is nowise a mere resultant or a predictable effect. 
I t  is in each case an instance of genuine upsurge in nature. 
And this fundamental character of emergence, outstandingly 
evident in the uprise of Life and of Mind, is manifested all 
along the line. Thus the emergence of consciousness covers 
a widespread gradation of processes, from the most rudi- 
mentary behavior of low organisms to the most complex 
intelligence in man. 
In his theory of emergence Alexander viewed the entire 
cosmic span, from Space-Time to Deity. He regarded evolu- 
tion as the natural history of values. "Daurinism is sometimes 
thought to be indifferent to values. It is in fact the history 
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of how values come into existence in the world of life. . . . 
The doctrine of natural selection explains not how types are 
generated but how they come to have ~a lue . "~  The arrow 
of dynamic reality at the level of spiritual activity points to 
an ever higher summit. We cannot assign any limits to 
creative intelligence. This ever higher emergent quality is 
what Alexander means by "Deity." We cannot define it, and 
we cannot say that it exists, but by its very character it is 
ever potential, the infinite Divine Beyond. 
An equally radical alternative to mechanistic biology is 
Henri Bergsoll's theory of Creative Evolution. The adjective 
in this term is intended to characterize not only evolution 
but reality altogether. Bergson criticizes the sciences and the 
philosophies of the past for their failure to give due recog- 
nition to the integral ongoing current of existence. In theory 
of knowledge he seeks to expose the inadequacy of intellec- 
tual construction with its schematic procedure. He objects to 
the misinterpretation of real time, duration, as a succession of 
discrete extents or moments. He criticizes the misleading 
view of the course of existence as a series of events. Against 
both the mechanistic outlook on nature as predetermined 
in every detail and the eternally planned teleology of Provi- 
dential design, he champions the recognition of really crea- 
tive consciousness and the living stream of reality. 
Bergson maintains activism in cosnlology without any 
reservation. "There are no things, there are only actions."" 
The cosmic agency, all-pervading in every living process, is 
the creative flood itseJf, the vital urge manifested through- 
our nature. He called it the e'lan uital. But it should be 
stated clearly that Bergson's insistence on the unpredictable 
creativity of living processes does not exclude absolutely the 
use of causal explanation in biology: not absolutely. Our 
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abstract mechanism, which serves us well enough perhaps, 
though imperfectly, in physics and chemistry, has its part in 
biology also. But in biology its part is nowise the chief role. 
The chief role, the dynamic principle in evolution, is the 
e'lan vital. Immersed in matter, it spurts out in ever new 
currents. We can regard plant and animal life as the two 
main directions of its outpouring, two ways of accumulating 
energy and then letting it flow into flexible channels. All the 
way through, we should emphasize the vital urge; we should 
get into the evolutionary flux itself, not reduce it to stages 
which we then ai-tificially try to recompose. 
The more directly we observe ourselves, the more clearly 
we see that we never stay put as mere discrete entities, but 
on the contrary are continually in a process of achieving our- 
selves. In the perspective of creative evolution we have no 
abstract universal character that can be analyzed and formu- 
Iated. We require a historical account: not explanation but 
portraiture. What is so evidently true of ourselves is true, in 
different degrees, also of lower forms of life in the stream 
of evolution. Evolving life manifests the origins and growth 
of new lives. The study of it is concei-ned primarily with 
genesis rather than with the repeated uniformities with 
which so much of abstract physical science deals. So Berg- 
son finds evolutionary inquiries enlightened by the sub- 
ordination of the traditionally scientific to a creative-histori- 
cal perspective.'" 
Even those who would not go the whole length with Berg- 
son or with Lloyd Morgan and Alexander or with Driesch 
have felt bound to admit the inadequacy of a rigidly mech- 
anistic biology. Surely the evolutionist cannot use the 
principle of adaptation without acknowledging its ultimate 
teleological implications. So T. H. Morgan concluded that 
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"the adaptations of organisms are something peculiar to 
living things, and their obvious purpose is to maintain the 
integrity of the individual or that of the species to which 
the individual be10ngs."~~ Against the mechanist's claim to 
Daiwinian leadership, it has been maintained by J. B. S. 
Maldane that "the theory of natural selection does not con- 
stitute the smallest step in the direction of a mechanistic 
conception of life." Variation and hereditary transmission 
cannot be understood rightly if we regard them as mere 
physico-chemical effects of the environment on the plant or 
animal. The living organism manifests some sort of purposive 
agency and initiative. "Heritable variation must be regarded 
as a fresh striking out of life."12 
The critics of a rigidly mechanistic theory in biology have 
cited a mass of evidence indicating purposive or quasi-pur- 
posive behavior, not only among mammals and birds but 
also at lower levels, especially among insects. The elaborate 
organization of insect life, in ant hilIs or beehives, has seemed 
to point beyond a strictly mechanistic explanation. Not only 
the functional explanations of behavior but also the struc- 
tural variation of organs adapted to definite conditions in 
the environment appears perplexing to a strictly physico- 
chemical theoiy of evolution. Critics have pointed out that 
the organism seems to proceed on some sort of a self-preserv- 
ing, self-promoting plan, with an initiative in variation and 
integration. Especially in the attainment of certain complex 
structures, as for instance in the evolution of the eye, there 
are cases where a great number of different and very deli- 
cate adjustments have to be realized before the organ can 
function advantageously at all, The explanation of the sur- 
vival and propagation of the many initial details of such a 
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structure on a factual mechanistic basis seems to strain belief. 
On the higher levels of animal life the evidence of dimly 
manifested and then more and more definite approaches to 
some form of mental activity raises further diEculties for 
the mechanist. Darwin realized that the evolutionary ex- 
planation of mental powers and the moral sense was a req- 
uisite part of his theo~y, and he treated these problems, 
wit11 his characteristic candor and caution, in The Descent 
of Man. His work in this fieId stimulated his followers to 
important extensive studies of the evolution of mind. Dis- 
tinguished worlcs in this field are Edward Westermarck's 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, L. T .  Hob- 
house's Morals in Evolution, and Alexander Sutherland's 
Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct. Westermarck and 
Robhouse center their attention on the historical evolution 
of morals in human life from the earliest primitive societies. 
Sutherland endeavors to follow Darwin further in tracing the 
first beginnings or antecedents of moral activity in the in- 
stincts and reactions of animal behavior. The spec8c theo- 
retical explanations advanced by these and other investi- 
gators may vary in detaiIs or in some major principles, but 
they all share the evolutionary outlook. 
We are told that in the far-flowing stream of life, organisms 
develop increasingly complex cerebro-neural systems capa- 
ble of conscious reactions, and then of mental response, 
moral behavior, understanding, and judgment of values. 
Animal gregariousness and the herd instinct develop into 
human social-mindedness; the urge for fighting back and 
for retaliation grows into a sense of retribution, with the 
recognition of justice and punitive law in prospect; the 
parental instinct and group solidarity mature into conscious 
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sympathy and benevolence; the effective restraint of off end- 
ing members and the corresponding individual sense of 
group compulsion ripen into a consciousness of moral obliga- 
tion, duty, and conscience. The regard for the preservation 
of the herd and flock grows and may gain precedence over 
the concern for individual survival. In these and other ways, 
the preface and the first chapters of evolutionaiy morals 
have been traced by Darwin and his successors. 
In a broader survey, not limited to moral behavior and 
not always viewed in evolutionistic perspectives, the be- 
ginnings of mental reactions in the life of the higher animals 
have likewise been made the subject of many detailed in- 
vestigations. It may suEce here to mention one outstanding 
example of this type of inquiry, Wolfgang Kohler's work, 
The Mentality of Apes. Ko111er noted that the brain struc- 
ture and the bodily chemistry of the higher apes show greater 
similarity to those of human organisms than to those of the 
lower apes. He studied with especial care the behavior of 
some chimpanzees which seemed in many ways like human 
responses, and he raised the question whether the apes 
may not show intelligence analogous to ours. If this ques- 
tion is answered affirmatively, we may be in a position to 
recognize in the first or primitive instances of animal intelli- 
gence some of the characteristic factors in the evolution of 
mind. 
Kohler does not proceed to dogmatic conclusions, but his 
researches indicate several lines of evidence for what may 
fairly be called a definite trend towards mentality in the be- 
havior of the higher apes. The chimpanzees which he ob- 
served were capable of using roundabout methods of catch- 
ing their objects. They showed some grasp of what the total 
situation required. They used strings or sticks or other imple- 
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ments to pull or push the food in the desired box or bag 
hanging or swinging out of their unaided reach. They would 
scratch a stone from the ground and throw it after an animal 
which they might be chasing; or, unable to move a heavy 
box on which they had to climb in order to grab the food 
suspended above their heads, they would first take out the 
stones that had been packed in it. They would join two 
sticks to lengthen their pole to the needed length, or pile 
up one box on top of another-four of them on one occasion 
-to gain the required height. This work was done sometimes 
in collaboration. They showed capacity for planning with 
foresight and with some control of very strong appetite. On 
their being driven from their stockade to their sleeping pens 
in the evening, they had to cross a spot covered with lush 
green weeds of which they were very fond. At first they all 
stormed upon their juicy fodder, but when the keeper drove 
them insistently towards their pens, one of the chimpanzees 
would suddenly stop eating and begin hastily to tear up the 
weeds and so would carry a tremendous bundle of them to his 
den.I3 
While some of these researches have been pursued with- 
out any explicitly evolutionistic purpose, they all have bear- 
ing on evolutionary theory. One interpretation of them has 
been to regard so-called mental behavior as the factual effect 
of biological reactions. But even on a basically mechanistic 
view of biological processes, this account must still recog- 
nize clearly the eventual attainment of mind. How is this 
recognition to be understood? Either we should adhere 
rigidly to the exclusively mechanistic perspective, in which 
case we miss the fundamental characteristics of mind. Or 
we may acknowledge the distinctive character of mental 
activity, of thought and understanding and purposive con- 
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duct and moral judgment. In  that case we should discern 
in the evolutionary course the attainment of non-mechanical 
activities, teleological and rational. We should then require a 
reinterpretation of the evolutionaiy process, to account for 
this attainment; we should have to expand or supplement 
the evolutionary perspective by other views of nature and 
of human character. 
The former, mechanistic explanation of the origin and de- 
velopment of mind, as gradually evolved from organic reac- 
tions and manifesting only physical and physiological 
properties, would claim the merit of undeviating naturalism 
in its explicit rejection of teleology in any form, admitting 
only purposeless behavior, determined mechanically. But 
then consistently it could not recognize genuinely pur- 
posive activity or pursuit of values anywhere, even at our 
human level. This view suffers from the essential defect of 
rigid materialism, for it cannot account for itself as a theory 
or for its claims to truth and validity. Reason cannot thus 
reason itself out of existence. 
If we appraise the second view, which begins by an un- 
ambiguous recognition of mind and its various forms of 
intelligent activity, the further inferences from it are veiy 
significant. The first one-a revision of evolutionary doctrine 
to include the clear explanation of mind-is illustrated in 
the theories of creative evolution and emergent evolution. 
Secondly, these two theories in their respective ways may 
proceed to a more expansive cosmic outlook on nature and on 
human character, from a number of significant approaches. 
Reality is complex, and nature is not to be exhausted in any 
one abstract formula. The physical sciences express in their 
postulates a view of the cosmic mechanism, and their fomu- 
lations of the structure and laws of nature have fully justifred 
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their mechanistic perspective. Evolutionary biology has 
shown its merits in appropriating to its use, as much as suita- 
ble, the physico-chemical outlook on nature. This principle 
in biological method was defended with balanced judg- 
ment even before Darwin's work by the great physiologist 
Johannes Miiller: "Though there appears to be something in 
the phenomena of living beings which cannot be explained in 
ordinary mechanical, physical, or chemical laws, much may 
be so explained, and we may witliout fear push these expla- 
nations as far as we can, so long as we keep to the solid 
ground of observation and experiment,"14 The last clause 
here is important in guiding sound fundamental theo~y in 
biology. Its distinctive problem, the understanding of living 
processes in their evolution, especially at its higher stages, 
has confronted the systematic evolutionist with the need of 
understanding the origin or the emergence of mind and of 
accounting for the boundless development of intelligence 
and of the values with which human beings have been char- 
acteristically identified. Evolutionary biology, rightly allied 
as it is on the one hand with the physicaI sciences and indeed 
having its basis in them, seems to open new vistas on reality, 
human and socia1 perspectives to which no rigid mechanistic 
formulas can do justice. 
These new vistas and the problems which they raise are 
shown in the expansion of evolutionary ideas in the various 
fields of the humanities. The basic idea of evolution, the 
principle of development as a cosmic category, has proved 
fruitful in many humanistic inquiries. All of us know the 
productive work which has been done in the evolution of 
social and economic institutions, the evolution of language, 
of art, of religion. We have just been considering briefly the 
investigation of the evolution of morals from the earliest 
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primitive societies, or earlier still, from the higher animals. 
The title of a notable treatise by Edward Caird comes to 
mind: The Euolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers. 
The examination of this varied material or even a cursory 
glance over the bibliographies in these respective fields 
would show the fruitful expansion of the humanistic outlook 
by the application of the evolutionary principle. Our in- 
sight into any human activity is clarified and deepened as 
we come to understand its gradual development. The genesis 
of ideas, practices, and institutions has some of its roots in 
physiological reactions to conditions in the environment. 
Searching inquiries in these fields indicate man's groping and 
then more definite advance from organic drives to intelligent 
purposes, We may trace the growth of the human animal to 
fuller rational stature. And we may thus perceive that even at  
his full maturity man never quite surmounts his animal 
rootage. He is ever illustrating the truth of Aristotle's defini- 
tion of him as a rational animal. In his most primitive state 
he is not altogether a beast, and at his highest levels of 
civilized existence he is never purely rational. He needs the 
two perspectives, related, to manifest his full nature. 
All these inquiries may be described as studies in the evo- 
lution of values. And values are characteristically expressed 
in contending intesplay. Their progressive emergence and 
development manifest what we may call the twofold, Janus- 
like outlook of the basic principle of evolution as it is applied 
to the various humanities. The development of social and 
economic processes and institutions is obviously bound up 
with climate, food-supply, and other environmental condi- 
tions, as well as with human demands and ideals. Language 
has its organic medium as well as its almost boundless range 
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of intellectual and poetic expression. The arts have yielded 
the high achievements of creative genius, but music has its 
physical and physiological aspects, and such a book-title as 
Anatomy f o ~  A?$-Students needs no further explanation. All 
along the line, evolution in the humanities Has been a dual 
manifestation of the complexity of human nature, empha- 
sizing the need for a philosophy of perspectives, to do jus- 
tice to the many fundamental aspects of reality. 
By way of closing summary, we may state that evolu- 
tionary biology, in one direction, has been marked by a 
thoroughly justified account of living processes in factual- 
mechanistic terms. But i l ~ e  further evolutionary insight has 
opened up another perspective of the genetic principle of 
development, Animal behavior that a t  its mdimentaiy be- 
ginnings seems to be only very complicated chemistry, mani- 
fests increasingly at its higher levels a teleological tendency, 
and then unambiguously purposive and intelligent activity. 
The evolutionary biologist was bound to include man in his 
zoological museum, but the course of evolution in human life 
could not be understood fully in the earlier terms, as survival 
or extinction by fortuitously fit or unfit adaptations to cer- 
tain environments, as a mere mechanics of behavior. 
The genetic process at human levels is a process increas- 
ingly directed by intelligence, a process of purposive activity, 
of choice between contending values, of achieving not only 
organic but also spiritual integration and fulfillment. This 
sort of genetic process is not a mere series of events but a 
significant career, which we commonly call history. The 
principle of evolution as used in the various humanities mani- 
fests cl~aracteristically this historical aspect. 
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